

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01987 01 OF 02 101923Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SAJ-01 AF-06 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ARA-06 OMB-01 ERDA-05 MC-02

VO-03 SCA-01 AID-05 EB-07 CIEP-01 TRSE-00 STR-04

CEA-01 COME-00 ORM-02 DHA-02 NEA-10 /122 W

----- 009266

R 101550Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9732

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 1987

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR

SUBJECT: SENATOR BROOKE QUERIES SOVIET OFFICIALS ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

1. SUMMARY: DURING SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH SENATOR BROOKE
FEBRUARY 9, TWO WELL INFORMED SOVIET OFFICIALS (LEADING POLITICAL
COMMENTATOR YURIY ZHUKOV AND USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV)
OUTLINED SOVIET VIEWS ON ANGOLA, SECRETARY'S SAN FRANCISCO
SPEECH, PORTUGAL, SALT, MBFR, TRADE AND EMIGRATION, AND
DETENTE GENERALLY. ZHUKOV AND ARBATOV INSISTED THE USSR HAD NO
LONG-TERM AIMS IN ANGOLA OR IN AFRICA BUT ONLY NOVELTY IN THEIR
EXPLANATION OF SOVIET POLICY WAS STRENGTH OF LINK BETWEEN CUBAN
AND SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE. ARBATOV WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT SALT II, SOMEWHAT LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT MBFR, AND BEARISH
ON JEWISH EMIGRATION. ON BALANCE, ARTATOV WAS UPBEAT ABOUT FUTURE
OF DETENTE. END SUMMARY.

2. SENATOR BROOKE QUESTIONED SOVIET POLITICAL COMMENTATOR (AND
SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTY) YURIY ZHUKOV ABOUT CURRENT SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY DURING SIXTY-MINUTE MEETING IN KREMLIN FEBRUARY 9.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01987 01 OF 02 101923Z

SENATOR ALSO DISCUSSED FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT GREATER LENGTH THAT
AFTERNOON, WHEN HE WAS RECEIVED BY USA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR

GEORGIY ARBATOV AND SENIOR INSTITUTE STAFF. SENATOR WAS ACCOMPANIED ON BOTH CALLS BY SENATE STAFFER DAVID ROSSITER AND EMBOFF. ATMOSPHERE FOR BOTH CALLS WAS RELAXED.

3. ANGOLA: BOTH ZHUKOV AND ARBATOV STRESSED THAT USSR HAD SUPPORTED MPLA SINCE EARLY 1960'S. USSR TODAY WAS RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR AID FROM A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA. CUBAN FORCES WERE THERE BECAUSE OF THE PRIOR INTERVENTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. THE USSR DESIRED NO BASES IN ANGOLA OR INDEED IN AFRICA. WOULD CUBAN FORCES WITHDRAW FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS? "I THINK SO," SAID ARBATOV, "ALTHOUGH I CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE CUBANS."

4. DID SECRETARY KISSINGER "OVERREACT", IN HIS RECENT SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH, TO SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA, THE SENATOR ASKED IN BOTH MEETINGS. WITH TYPICAL BLUNTNESS, ZHUKOV STATED "WE FEEL KISSINGER'S EVALUATION OF EVENTS IN ANGOLA HAS NO BASIS IN FACT". ARBATOV SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT WANT TO CRITICIZE INDIVIDUALS IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS THE FEELING EXISTED AFTER VIETNAM THAT THE U.S. MUST ACT DECISIVELY WHENEVER IT PERCEIVED AN INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE. "I DON'T EXPECT SECRETARY KISSINGER OR THE U.S. IN GENERAL TO LIKE OUR POLICY IN ANGOLA," HE CONTINUED, "BUT THIS SHOULD NOT LEAD US INTO A CONFRONTATION." THE USSR IS NOT COMPETING WITH THE U.S. FOR EVERY SPECK OF FOREIGN SOIL, ARBATOV NOTED. IF PRESS ACCOUNTS ARE CORRECT, THE SECRETARY HAS IMPLIED A LINKAGE BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SALT, AND "THIS WOULD BE OUT OF PLACE." AFTER ALL, THE SOVIETS COULD HAVE LINKED SALT I WITH U.S. MINING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS IN 1972 BUT DID NOT BECAUSE OF THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION.

5. ON PORTUGAL, BOTH ZHUKOV AND ARBATOV SAID WESTERN NEWS MEDIA HAD BEEN FULL OF LIES ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT (INCLUDING THE "PONOMAREV LETTER," GOLD SHIPMENTS, AND UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES. "THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER DONE SUCH THINGS AND NEVER WILL," SAID ZHUKOV. "I AM SURE THAT FROM THE BEGINNING WE HAD A MODERATING INFLUENCE THERE," SAID ARBATOV. BOTH NOTED THAT SOVIET-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS WERE NORMAL AND THAT PORTUGUESE PEOPLE SHOULD CHOOSE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01987 01 OF 02 101923Z

6. ON SALT, ZHUKOV SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE SECRETARY KISSINGER REMARK UPON RETURNING TO THE U.S. FROM HIS RECENT MOSCOW VISIT THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SIGN A SALT II AGREEMENT THIS SUMMER. ARBATOV SAID HE WAS NOT FREE TO DISCUSS EVEN THOSE BITS OF INFORMATION HE HAD ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW, BUT FELT IN GENERAL THAT THERE HAD BEEN REAL PROGRESS DURING THE VISIT. THE USSR PUT FORWARD SOME NEW PROPOSALS AND NOW EXPECTED SOME COMPROMISE PROPOSALS FROM THE U.S. ARBATOV PERSONNALLY FELT -- "I MAY NOT AGREE WITH MY GOVERNMENT ON THIS," -- THERE SHOULD BE

NO FUNDAMENTAL COMPROMISE ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. THEY ARE LIKE MIRV'S: ONCE TESTED AND OPERATIONAL, THE ARMS RACE WILL HAVE ENTERED A QUALITATIVELY NEW STAGE. THE BACKFIRE BOMBER DID NOT SERIOUSLY EQUATE THE TWO WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

7. ARBATOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES WONDERED IF A SALT II AGREEMENT COULD BE APPROVED BY THE SENATE DURING THE CURRENT SESSION IF INITIALED IN MAY OR JUNE. THE SENATOR SAID IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION NO SIGNIFICANT ISSUE WOULD BE ACTED UPON BY THE SENATE FROM JUNE UNTIL AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS.

8. SENATOR BROOKE ASKED ARBATOV FOR HIS VIEW OF THE WEST'S LATEST PROPOSAL, "OPTION III," ON MBFR. WE WELCOME THE CONCEPT OF INCLUDING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, ARBATOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES SAID, BUT WE HAVE NOT PREPARED A RESPONSE CONCERNING SPECIFIC NUMBERS. HOWEVER, THE BASIC PROBLEM REMAINS: WESTERN INSISTENCE ON CHANGING THE TIME-TESTED EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES VERSUS THE EAST'S VIEW THAT THE CURRENT BALANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED.

9. ON ARMS TRANSFERS TO "THIRD WORLD" COUNTRIES, THE SENATOR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET POSITION TO BE THAT "NATIONAL LIBERATION" WAS INEVITABLE AND SHOULD BE ASSISTED. ZHUKOV RESPONDED ONLY THAT MANY U.S. ARMS HAD BEEN USED AGAINST THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. ARBATOV SAID WITH A SMILE THAT THERE WERE NOT MANY COLONIES LEFT TO BE LIBERATED.

10. DURING A LENGTHY DISCUSSION AT THE USA INSTITUTE, OF THE MFN, CREDITS, AND EMIGRATION ISSUE, THE SENATOR SAID HE SAW NO CHANCE FOR REVERSAL OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT IN 1976 AND COULD NOT PREDICT THE SITUATION IN 1977. THE ADMINISTRATION
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 01987 01 OF 02 101923Z

HAD TRIED VERY HARD TO DEFEAT JACKSON-VANIK, BROOKE STRESSED, BUT THE POLITICAL FORCES SUPPORTING THE AMENDMENT WERE STILL LARGELY IN PLACE. THE SENATOR SAID HE SAW NO SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THIS IMPASSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01987 02 OF 02 101947Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SAJ-01 AF-06 SAM-01 ACDA-05 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ARA-06 OMB-01 ERDA-05 MC-02

VO-03 SCA-01 AID-05 EB-07 CIEP-01 TRSE-00 STR-04

CEA-01 COME-00 ORM-02 DHA-02 NEA-10 /122 W

----- 009670

R 101550Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9733

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 1987

11. ARBATOV SAID THE USSR WAS VERY CAUTIOUS ON THIS ISSUE: IF WE SHOW INTEREST IN BREAKING THE IMPASSE, "SILLY IDEAS MAY BE PLANTED IN NOT VERY WISE HEADS THAT THE USSR CAN BE PRESSED, CAN BE BLACKMAILED." PASSAGE OF JACKSON-VANIK HAS HAD LITTLE NET NEGATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE USSR, ALTHOUGH IT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY DIMMED THE PROSPECT FOR SOVIET-U.S. TRADE AT LEAST OVER THE COMING FIVE YEARS. (IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BARNES FEBRUARY 3, HIS DEPUTY BOGDANOV HAD SAID THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SOVIET PLANNING PROCESS REQUIRED FIVE-YEAR PROJECTIONS, AND IN THE CASE OF THE NEW PLAN HAD HAD TO GO FORWARD ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT CURRENT TRENDS (I.E., NONAVAILABILITY OF MFN AND USG CREDITS,) WOULD CONTINUE.) THE CHIEF IMPLICATION OF THE AMENDMENT WAS POLITICAL RATHER THAN ECONOMIC: "PEOPLE HERE ASK IF WE CAN TRUST THE AMERICANS" IN BILATERAL UNDERTAKINGS. "THE BELIEF IS THAT SOMETHING MUST BE DONE, PRIMARILY BY THE U.S. SIDE," TO BREAK THE IMPASSE. IN THE LONG RUN THE AMENDMENT HAS TO BE REPEALED, ARBATOV CONTINUED. MEANWHILE, THE USSR IS GETTING CREDITS FROM OTHER TRADING PARTNERS.

12. SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION HAD DECLINED FOR TWO REASONS, ARBATOV SAID. FIRST, MOST OF THOSE ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE USSR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01987 02 OF 02 101947Z

WHO WISHED TO LEAVE HAD DONE SO. SECOND, THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR CAUSED MANY SOVIET JEWS TO HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT LEAVING THE USSR FOR ISRAEL. THERE CERTAINLY HAD BEEN NO REPRESSION AGAINST SOVIET JEWS AFTER PASSAGE OF JACKSON-VANIK. THE SENATOR SAID THAT AS A LAWYER HE RECOGNIZED THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LOW EMIGRATION RATE. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF MUTUAL TRUST. AMERICANS ARE GENUINELY PUZZLED ABOUT THE REASONS AND NEEDED CLEAR, HARD DATA. IF

JACKSON-VANIK WERE SUDDENLY TAKEN AWAY, ARBATOV SAID, THERE WOULD BE NO BIG RISE IN EMIGRATION.

13. DURING A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF DETENTE, ARBATOV SAID HE FELT THE MAIN BENEFITS FOR THE U.S., AS WELL AS FOR THE USSR, WERE (1) DECREASE PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, (2) MORE RESTRAINT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY IN THE ARMS RACE, AND (3) THE CHANCE OF NEGOTIATE POLITICAL PROBLEMS, SUCH AS THE 1973 WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND OF COURSE WE HAVE ONLY SCRATCHED THE SURFACE IN ECONOMIC BENEFITS. ARBATOV THOUGH DETENTE WOULD SURVIVE THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS NO MATTER WHO WON. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD DEMAND ITS CONTINUATION. NEW PROBLEMS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL ARISE: PERHAPS SOME NEW MILITARY BREAKTHROUGH, PERHAPS A NEW INTERNATIONAL TROUBLE SPOT LIKE LEBANON. TO SURVIVE THIS, WE MUST BUILD A STRONG MARGIN OF GOOD WILL AND A STURDY MECHANISM FOR COOPERATION.

14. COMMENT: ZHUKOV AND ARBATOV GAVE SENATOR BROOKE AN ARTICULATE SUMMARY OF CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS: TOUGH ON ANGOLA, MILDLY UPBEAT ON SALT, RETICENT ON TRADE/EMIGRATION, DEVOTED TO DETENTE AS THE SOVIETS SEE IT. THE ONLY NON-STANDARD POINTS ARE THE ALLUSIONS TO THE HAIPHONG PARALLEL AND TO THE IMMINENT END OF THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS (ALTHOUGH BOTH HAVE ARISEN IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE USA INSTITUTE), AND THE STRONG LINKAGE OF THE CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCES IN ANGOLA. STOESEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DETENTE, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, CODELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MOSCOW01987
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760050-0927
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760264/aaaacecv.tel
Line Count: 249
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <06 MAY 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <31 AUG 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SENATOR BROOKE QUERIES SOVIET OFFICIALS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, AO, US, (BROOKE, EDWARD W), (ZHUKOV, YURIY), (ARBATOV, GEORGIY)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006